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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an anonymous scheme for
file retrieval systems, MIX-Crowds, in which it is harder for an
attacker to identify the requester of the file by making use of
the idea of MIX [7] and Crowds [20] to establish a path from
the requester to the file holder. Result shows that predecessor
attack [26] is much more difficult to succeed compared with
Crowds [20]. We are able to reduce the estimated number of
rounds needed for successful predecessor attack for MIX-Crowds.
We also propose a file transfer strategy according to file size.
With such strategy, requests for small size files can be completed
faster while the downloading time of large size files only increases
slightly.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of Internet, protection of the privacy
of users has been one of the paramount concerns for the public.
Users send and receive emails, surf websites for information,
share ideas with others in newsgroups and message boards
via the Internet. In some Internet applications, for example,
online shopping, customers need to reveal their identity to the
server. However on some occasions, one may wish to hide
one’s identity in sharing and obtaining sensitive information
to and from others. Thus, a large number of anonymous
applications with different purposes has been proposed over
the years. Some representative examples are Crowds [20] used
for anonymous web browsing; Freenet [8], Free Haven [9]
used for anonymous files distribution; Babel [12] used for
anonymous email; Onion Routing [10] used to anonymize
TCP-based applications.
From the introduction of Napster [2], peer-to-peer file-
sharing systems have been very popular. However, many com-
mon peer-to-peer file-sharing applications offer no protection
of users anonymity. By examining the IP address of the peer
node where a file request comes from or a file is published,
it is very easy to find out the identity of the node. Privacy of
users in these peer-to-peer applications would be compromised
easily.
As a result, a couple of anonymous file publishing and re-
trieval systems were proposed. Most of these systems achieve
anonymity by sending the request for a file to at least one
other node instead of contacting the file holder directly. The
main differences among these systems are how they locate
the file and how they choose the next node in a sequence
of nodes to the file holder. In some anonymous file sharing
applications, like Freenet [8], nodes are assigned random node
IDs. To search for a file with key k, the original requester sends
out a request for the file to its neighbor with the closest node
ID to k. The file request will then be forwarded by this node to
its neighbor with the closest node ID to k. Subsequently, it is
likely that the request will finally reach a node which currently
holds the file. This scheme has three drawbacks: (i) when a
node receives a request from its predecessor node, the farther
the file key is from the predecessor node’s ID, the more likely
that the predecessor node is the original requester. (ii) as the
size of the network grows, the path length can be very long [8].
This increases the time of the file transfer, as it is more likely
that some of the nodes on the path leave the network during
the transfer. Consequently, the transfer has to be performed
again, increasing the chance that an attacker will identify the
requesting node. (iii) as the network is loosely structured,
there is no guarantee that a file will be located successfully,
even it exists in the network. Some other applications like
Ghostshare [19] use an overlay network to guarantee that file
will be located successfully. The next node is usually chosen
from the routing table of the requesting node. However, the
attacker may change entries in a victim’s routing table setting
the attacker as a neighbor node, as pointed out in [6]. In
that case, all of the victim’s requests will be revealed by
the attacker. Moreover, it is possible that the attacker can log
down the predecessor of the request, known as the predecessor
attack, in a fashion described in [26]. With sufficient numbers
of file re-transfer, the attacker will be able to identify the file
requester with high probability.
We propose a new anonymity scheme, MIX-Crowds, for
file sharing network. MIX-Crowds makes use of the idea of
MIX [7] and Crowds [20] to establish a path from the requester
to the file holder, where predecessor attack is much more
difficult to succeed compared with Crowds.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we
describe the system design of MIX-Crowds and how anony-
mous file retrieval can be achieved based on the use of
an overlay network together with other system components.
Other issues such as nodes management, file publishing and
transfer strategies are also discussed. In Section III, anonymity
and security analysis of MIX-Crowds are performed. Our
analysis on anonymity is mainly based on modified version of
predecessor attack. We also compare MIX-Crowds with other
anonymity communication systems with regard to the degree
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of anonymity, overhead, as well as other performance and
security issues. The paper is concluded with some suggestions
of future research directions for MIX-Crowds in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM COMPONENTS OF MIX-CROWDS
A. Chaum’s MIX and Crowds
Chaum’s MIX [7] achieved anonymity by public key cryp-
tography. By encrypting the message together with the recip-
ient address and sending it through a series of MIXes, the
correspondence between the sender and the receiver can be
hidden. Due to the use of layered encryption, the MIXes will
have no idea of what is being transferred. Many improvements
to MIXes system have been proposed [15], [14], [5]. However,
due to the high latency associated with the use of public key
cryptography, batching of messages, etc, these systems can
only be used in high latency systems such as emails.
Crowds [20] provides anonymity of users from the web
servers. Instead of contacting a single anonymous proxy like
Anonymizer [1], a request first goes through a “jondo” (node)
which in turn will forward the request to another jondo with
probability p before submitting the request to the web server.
As a result, jondos are able to view the content of the request
and reply. By adjusting p to a higher value, different degree
of anonymity can be achieved. Analysis in [26] shows that a
higher p value can have stronger defense against predecessor
attack. For details of predecessor attack, please refer to [26].
The inefficiency of MIX is due to encryption and decryption
of the whole message. It is hard for nodes on the path to
determine the encrypted message. However, if all intermediate
nodes do not know what file they are transferring, it will be
very slow for the file to spread in the network in spite of the
high demand of the file. This is because the file requester,
who wishes to stay anonymous, is likely not to send the file
to others. On the other hand, it is more flexible for Crowds to
spread the file where the path is determined by the next node
recursively, but the content is known to all nodes on the path.
In MIX-Crowds, the advantages of both schemes are taken
into account.
B. Network Topology
1) Directory Server: In a MIX system, the sender chooses
a series of MIXes that the message will go through and wrap
the message and address of MIXes together with their public
keys. Thus to apply layered encryption, each node must have a
public-private key pair. In MIX-Crowds, we assume that there
is a directory server, like the blender in Crowds, which keeps
the public key information in addition to the list of nodes. In
other words, each node will know the public keys of all other
nodes. Each node submits its public key to the directory server,
and keeps its private key itself. The directory server keeps the
public key and the corresponding IP address for each node.
2) Secure Node ID Assignment: In Chord [23], it is as-
sumed that node IDs are assigned by applying a hash function
on the IP addresses. This is not secure, as stated in [6]. An
attacker holding a large number of IP addresses can easily
target at a particular node in the overlay network, viewing
and directing all the messages which the node sends out to
the overlay network.
Some suggestions are given in [6] to prevent an attacker
from registering a large number of nodes in the network: the
first preventive measure is binding node IDs to real-world
identities, however this would compromised anonymity . The
second measure is requiring nodes to consume computing
resources in order to be able to use a given node ID with an
IP address, for example, finding a string x such that the result
of a one-way hash function of x together with the IP address
and the node ID will have certain number of bits equal to 0.
However, this would increase the number of choices for node
ID by computationally powerful nodes. Also this may take a
long time for nodes with limited computational resources.
Fig. 1. Sample of CAPTCHA Challenge
It is not effective to limit the rate of an attacker joining
a network by computational resources, whereas it is effective
to bind node ID to a human entity. Hence we propose using
CAPTCHA [25] to achieve the effect. CAPTCHA stands for
“Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers
and Humans Apart”, which can be used to determine whether
the user is a human based on some challenge-response tests.
For example, by asking the user to identify the characters
in a distorted image which is hard to be recognized by a
computer program. Yahoo! [4] uses CAPTCHA to prevent web
robots from registering accounts. Figure 1 shows a sample of
CAPTCHA challenge provided in The CAPTCHA project [3].
The word “MIXCROWD” has to be provided in order to pass
the challenge. Some variants of CAPTCHA, such as logical
and mathematical questions, are also used on the Internet.
In MIX-Crowds, CAPTCHA can be used as follows: before
joining the network, a node first needs to contact a directory
server, and the directory server will return a CAPTCHA
challenge to the node. If the user inputs the response correctly,
the directory server will accept the public key provided by the
user. Then the directory server will provide a certificate for the
user and update its database record. This limit the speed of
the attacker joining the network, as human judgment is needed
in the joining process. However, if only a single CAPTCHA
challenge is required for joining, it may be possible for the
attacker to use low cost labor to join the network. Thus
periodic revalidation of node IDs may be necessary. Nodes
can revalidate their node IDs at any time. Given the on-time
for most (> 95%) of the nodes in a peer-to-peer file-sharing
network is less than one day [16], it is reasonable to require
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a node to revalidate their node IDs in one day or two. Thus a
signicant amount of human resources is needed for the attacker
to maintain a large number of nodes in the network.
3) File Location Scheme: Table I summarizes the symbols
used in this section.
Symbol Definition
Ni Node i in the network
Fi File i in the network
IDi ID for Ni in the main network
IDi,j ID for Ni in Fj sub-network
Ri Root node for Fi
Ei Entrance node of Fi sub-network
Hi Key of Fi
Hi,j Key used to forward request for Fj from Ni at Rj
· Concatenation operator
TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS USED IN FILE LOCATION SCHEME
In locating Fi, we need Hi which is a 160-bit SHA-1
content hash of Fi. We assume that the nodes already have the
key of the file when they perform searching, as in Freenet [8].
Keyword searching may also be added to the system using the
scheme proposed in [27], [19].
Chord [23] is used as the underlying overlay network with
some security improvements mentioned in [6]. The improve-
ments include protection against Sybil attack [11], bad routing
table updates and dropping messages. The reason why Chord
is chosen is that its routing table is tightly constrained and
it has fixed node ID assignments, which is suitable for the
improvement on security.
In Chord, replicas of objects (files) will be sent to replica
nodes directly by the publisher. This would compromise
anonymity as replica nodes will know who the publisher is.
Moreover, replica nodes may leave the system, resulting in
handover of the file to other nodes, which may take a long
time for large files. Furthermore, a node having its ID close
to the key of some popular files will likely use up a lot of its
uploading capacity for the files.
Instead of using a set of replica nodes to keep the replicated
file, we use a second level Chord network for each file, which
will be managed by the nodes holding the file and the replica
nodes.
Below we describe our proposed scheme of file location
with the use of the overlay network Chord. In Figure 2, the
whole Chord network consists of 8 nodes. N2 is the root node
for F1 held by N1 and N7. For simplicity, the replica nodes
for F1 is not shown. Instead of keeping references to peer
nodes holding F1, N2 only keeps a pointer to N7. Note that
we can keep several pointers for fault tolerance. When N2
receives a request for file F1, it forwards the message to the
F1 sub-network through N7.
Assignment of node IDs in the F1 sub-network depends on
H1 and ID of nodes holding F1 (N1 and N7). In general, file
sub-network node IDs will be assigned as follow (· stands for
concatenation):
IDi,j = SHA1(IDi ·Hj)
Fig. 2. The overlay network structure of MIX-Crowds
The key Hi,j used by Rj(the root node of Fj) to forward
request from Ni in the Fj sub-network will be calculated as
follows:
Hi,j = SHA1(IDi · Hj)
The calculation of Hi,j is almost the same as that of IDi,j ,
the only difference is that Ni is sending a request for Fj
instead of being a holder of Fj .
Network/Sub-network File Key ID
Main - ID2
F2 sub-network H2 ID2,2 = SHA1(ID2 ·H2)
TABLE II
IDS HELD BY N2
File File Key Entrance Node ID
F1 H1 N7 ID7
TABLE III
ENTRANCE NODE TABLE FOR N2
Table II shows the IDs of N2 in the main chord network (i.e.
ID2) and the file sub-network (i.e. ID2,2). Table III shows the
entrance to file sub-network kept by N2 (only F1 in this case).
The forwarding tables for the chord networks are not shown.
Now suppose N7 requests file F2. First in the main chord
network it sends the request to N4 (which is root node of
F2). N4 will then send a request message for F2 with the key
H7,2 = SHA1(ID7, H2) to N2, which is the entrance node
(E2) kept by N4 for the F2 sub-network, N4 will ask N2 to
forward the request further to the node with “closest” ID to
H7,2 in F2 sub-network, which is N6. Finally N6 sends F2
back to N7.
C. Anonymous File Retrieval
In common anonymous file retrieval system (referring to
table IV), when NR wants to obtain a file F , it contacts the
file holder NH using a Crowds like scheme: to reach the file
holder, the initiator NR forwards the request RF containing
the file key HF of file F to another node N1 first. N1 will
submit the request to the overlay network with probability
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Symbol Definition
F The file to be requested
HF Key (Hash Value) of the file F to be requested
RF Request for the file F to be sent
NR Requester of the file
NH Holder of the file
NP Publisher of the file
Ni Node i in the network
Ki Public Key of Ni
K−1i Private Key of Ni
Si Temporary Symmetric Key generated by Ni
and used by Ni+2 to encrypt the file
Ai IP Address of Ni
TABLE IV
LIST OF SYMBOLS USED
1 − p, or forward the request to another random node N2
with probability p. N2 repeats the forementioned procedure
performed by N1. Finally, the request will reach NH through
the overlay network, and F will be returned to N1 through
the original path, in reverse order, as illustrated in figure 3.
Fig. 3. Anonymous file transfer using MIX-Crowds
If we use the above scheme to reach NH , there are draw-
backs. Each intermediate node observing a request for F will
know that its predecessor has a certain chance to be NR.
If there are 10% of attackers in the network, there is 10%
chance that the file requester will be logged. If p = 0.5, each
intermediate node can be about 50% sure that the predecessor
is the file requester for F . Moreover, if the transfer is long
enough such that some of the intermediate nodes leave the
system, the transfer path have to be reset. If the number of
reset becomes high, it is likely that the file requester will be
revealed.
To minimize the successful chance of this type of attack,
we encrypt the request with more than one public key. To
request F , NR first chooses more than one node (e.g., the two
nodes N1 and N2 in figure 4), and construct a message M as
follows:
M = K1(A2,K2(RF , SR)) (1)
where SR is the symmetric key generated by NR to be used
by N2 to encrypt F to prevent N1 from knowing what file
request is being transferred. If AES is used to encrypt the
file, performance should not be a problem. It takes about 30
clock cycles per byte for encryption and decryption using dif-
ferent implementations of AES on Pentium II machines [22].
Thus the time for encryption and decryption should be small
compare to the transfer delay for the file. When N1 receives
M and apply K−11 on it. It only reveals A2 and another
encrypted message. Only N2 will know about the content
in RF . However, N2 does not know who is the predecessor
of the request (i.e., NR). N2 will submit the request to the
overlay network with probability 1 − p. With probability p,
it chooses two other nodes N3 and N4, creating the message
M ′ = K3(A4,K4(RF , S2)) and send it to N3. The process
repeats until the request is submitted to the overlay network.
When the request reaches the file holder NH , NH returns
the file back via the original path to NR. The above process
is illustrated in figure 4.
Fig. 4. File transfer using MIX-Crowds
D. Delegate Nodes for File Publishing
If anonymity is needed for the file holders, delegate nodes
can be used so that no actual file holders will register them-
selves on the network. The idea of delegate nodes works as
follows: first the file publisher or a file holder NH holding
F chooses a random node on the network as its delegate
node N ′H . At that time, N ′H does not have the file F . The
delegate node pretends it to be NH and register itself on
the sub-network. When a request reaches N ′H , it directs the
request to NH . After that, NH returns the file to N ′H and
then to the requesting node. N ′H may further choose another
delegate node to increase the anonymity for the file holder
NH . After the transfer, the number of file holders will increase
(explained in later sections), NH can stop being a file holder
and N ′H can leave the sub-network, minimizing the risk of
being accounted for distributing the file. As a result, it is
difficult for a collaborator to identify all the nodes holding
and distributing the file currently using the overlay network.
E. Optimizing File Transfer
1) Four Classes of File Transfer: Study in [13] shows
that most requests in a peer-to-peer file sharing network are
for “small” objects. 90% of file transfers are smaller than
10MB in file size. However, they only occupy about 15%
of the total traffic. On the other hand, less than 10% of file
transfers are over 100MB, but accounting for about 65% of
the total traffic. This implies that a small percentage of large
file requests will greatly jeopardize the transfer and queuing
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time of typical small file requests if the file size is not taken
into consideration.
In order to shorten the transfer time of the majority of the
files in MIX-Crowds, we separate files into 4 classes with
respect to their sizes: 0 − 2MB, 2 − 10MB, 10 − 100MB,
> 100MB. This is based on measurements in [13] where file
size is separated into three prominent regions (0−2MB and 2−
10MB is combined into one class). The reasons of separating
files < 10MB in size into two classes are: (1) the regions
0.1−2 and 2−10 are of different slopes (quite significantly) (2)
typical sizes for text documents, images as well as description
files which can be used for keyword searching are less than
2MB.
Most of the nodes on the Internet have uploading capacity
much less than their downloading capacity. Therefore we focus
on how the uploading capacity is to be allocated to different
classes of file transfer. A fraction of uploading capacity will
be reserved for each class of file transfer in each node. If a
node has 40KB/s of uploading capacity to be evenly allocated
among four classes, 10KB/s of uploading capacity will be
reserved for each class. When all the transfers in a particular
class are completed, the uploading capacity will be temporary
allocated to other classes. In this case, transfers of small files
can always be done in a relatively short time. Moreover, file
transfer of large files can also be performed at a reasonable
speed. Overall, the average transfer and queuing time can be
shortened.
2) Limitation on Maximum Number of Connections: In
most source rewriting anonymous file retrieval systems, a
file will propagate through several nodes before reaching the
requester. In this case, when a file is transfered, the file transfer
time depends on the connection with the lowest transfer rate.
If we limit the maximum number of connection such that
each connection can have a minimum guaranteed uploading
capacity, the transfer time can be reduced. For example, if
the minimum guaranteed uploading capacity per connection
is 5KB/s, then the maximum number of connections is 8
for a node with an uploading capacity of 40KB/s. As the
average transfer time is shorten, it will be less likely that the
connection will be broken during the transfer. As a result, the
chance that a node needs to reissue its request is reduced.
As mentioned in section II-E1, uploading capacity will be
shared evenly among all classes of file transfers. Therefore if
a node has an uploading capacity of 40KB/s and a minimum
uploading capacity 5KB/s per connection then the maximum
number of connections is 8 and the maximum number of
connections per class is 2.
Simulation results using the aforementioned file transfer
strategy in enhancing the performance of MIX-Crowds are
given in [24].
F. Selecting the Next Two Nodes
Before asking other nodes to help with the transfer, a node
will first determine if other nodes are currently overloaded
(having a lot of requests in the transfer queue). Instead of
using a global server keeping track of workloads of the peers,
result in [28] shows that the throughput of peer-to-peer file
sharing systems using the following selection algorithm is as
good as other sophisticated or global algorithms. Thus we can
make use of a node selection algorithm described below:
1) The requesting node NR randomly chooses two nodes
N1 and N2 first. NR then sends a different list of node
addresses (randomly selected from the address list given
by the directory server, with no repeating entries) to N1
and N2. N1 and N2 will then ask for the current load
value (e.g., the number of requests in the queue divided
by the number of available connections) of each given
node in the list provided by NR. For example, node N3
and node N4 which have the lowest load values in the
list will be returned to NR as a result.
2) NR can then issue a file request to N3 and N4.
In this way, we can ask for the current individual load value
of other nodes while not compromising anonymity much. The
reasons are as follows:
1) If NR asks the load value of each node in the list directly,
the probed node may be able to guess who is the re-
questing node (by referring to the most frequent peer(s)
asking for the node’s load value). Also a compromised
node can always return a very low load value to NR in
order to increase the chance of being selected.
2) If N1 or N2 is compromised, it cannot control the list
of nodes selected by NR (unless the directory server is
compromised). N1 and N2 can only ignore NR’s list of
nodes.
3) For the nodes in each list (selected by NR), they don’t
know which node is asking for their load values, unless
they compromised with N1 or N2. Reporting a low load
value indicates that the node is able to serve for the
request in a short time. Therefore tracking of dishonest
nodes may be needed with the help of a reputation
system [21].
In this section, we have introduced the system components
of MIX-Crowds and the scheme on how anonymous file
retrieval can be done. With the help of a directory server,
public key information can be used to hide the content of
the file from the next node. File location can be done with
the use of an overlay network. Some enhancements to the
system such as dividing file transfers into classes, limiting
the maximum number of connections, together with a node
selection algorithm taking load balancing into account have
also been made.
III. ANONYMITY ANALYSIS OF MIX-CROWDS
In this section, we will perform anonymity and security
analysis on MIX-Crowds. We will first analyze the anonymity
of MIX-Crowds based on [26] with some modifications and
extension. Then we will compare the anonymity of MIX-
Crowds with other anonymous communication systems. Fi-
nally, security analysis under some common attacks will be
provided.
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A. Predecessor Attack for the Proposed Scheme
In [26], predecessor attack on Crowds [20] is defined as
follows: during path formation, the collaborator logs down
the predecessor of each request it receives. After a number
of rounds, the chance that the initiator will appear is much
higher than that of the non-initiator. Thus identification of the
initiator is possible in a long term.
In our proposed scheme, to identify which node is the
file requester of a particular file F , the collaborator must
identify two entities: the file being transferred and who
is the predecessor. Suppose NR sends a request message
M = K1(A2,K2(RF , SR)) to N1. If N1 is a collaborating
node, it does not know which file is requested by NR. If
N2 is a collaborating node, it also does not know which
node is requesting F . The collaborator will know that NR
is requesting F if N1 and N2 are both controlled by the
collaborator. However, the collaborator cannot be sure that NR
is the file requester since NR may be forwarding request on
behalf of other nodes. There is a method that the collaborator
can increase its chance of identifying the file requester. If one
of the nodes selected by NR is compromised, the collaborator
can simply ignore the request, hoping that NR will next choose
two collaborating nodes.
Suppose there are n nodes in the network, with c collabo-
rating nodes. Denote Ci,j as the event that i nodes out of j
nodes chosen by NR is compromised. The chance that both
nodes chosen by NR are compromised is (assume that the
network is large enough so that the effect of node replacement
is negligible):
P (C2,2) =
( c
n
)( c
n
)
=
c2
n2
(2)
The chance that one of the two nodes is compromised is:
P (C1,2) =
(
2
1
)( c
n
)(n− c
n
)
=
2c(n− c)
n2
(3)
In Crowds, Hk denotes the event that the first collaborator
on the path occupies the kth position on the path, where the
initiator occupies the 0th position and Hk+ = Hk∨Hk+1∨ ....
In our scheme, two nodes are chosen in a group. Thus we
denote Hk as the event that the first pair of collaborators on the
path occupies the kth pair position on the path. For example,
H1 denotes the event that the all nodes chosen by NR are
compromised. Also denote I the event that the first group of
collaborators on the path is immediately preceded by the file
requester.
It is obvious that P (I) = c
2
n2 . However, if the collaborator
uses the strategy which ignores the file request unless both
nodes chosen by NR are compromised, it can increase its
chance of identifying the predecessor. Denote P (I ′) be the
probability of identifying the predecessor using such strategy.
P (I ′) = P (I) + P (C1,2)P (I ′)
P (I ′) =
P (I)
1− P (C1,2) (4)
For example, when n = 1000 and c = 100, P (C1,2) = 0.18,
P (I) = 0.01 and P (I ′) = 0.0122. We can see that the chance
is increased by about 22%. Our analysis follows similarly to
that in [26] but with the reduction of number of rounds needed
in identifying the requester.
The justification of the above equation is reasoned as follow.
At first, if the first two nodes chosen by the file requester
are both collaborating nodes, the collaborator succeeds. Oth-
erwise, if at least one of the two nodes is a collaborating
node, the collaborator can ignore the request and wait for the
file requester to start the node selection process again, going
back to the original situation.
Denote σ as the probability that the file requester is identi-
fied as the predecessor by the collaborator.
σ = P (H1) = P (I ′) =
P (I)
1− P (C1,2)
= (
c2
n2
)(
n2
n2 − 2c(n− c) ) =
c2
n2 − 2c(n− c) (5)
Now since the collaborator will ignore the request if only
one of them is chosen, H2+ can be given by (p is the
forwarding probability)
P (H2+) =
∞∑
i=1
(
p(n− c)2
n2
)i
σ
=
(
p(n− c)2
n2 − p(n− c)
)
σ
=
pσ(n− c)2
(n2 − p(n− c)2) (6)
The probability that a non-collaborating node will appear
before a pair of collaborating nodes, σ′, will be:
σ′ =
P (H2+)
n− c =
pσ(n− c)
(n2 − p(n− c)2) (7)
Let T be the total number of rounds that the file requester
successfully selected two nodes (case (1): both are attackers,
case (2): both are non-attackers). And B(T, σ) be a binomial
distribution with parameters T and σ.
We make use of a similar approach described in [26], in
which we improve the estimate of the number of rounds
needed in identifying the requester (reducing the number of
rounds needed by 20% for the same level of confidence). The
probability that the file requester and a non-requester will
appear before the first collaborator in a round is given by
σ = c
2
n2−2c(n−c) and σ
′ = pσ(n−c)(n2−p(n−c)2) respectively. We need
to make sure that the file requester will appear more than that
of any non-requester.
To make sure that the file requester will appear at least (1−
δ)Tσ times, where 0 < δ < 1, we apply Chernoff Bound [18]:
Pr {B(T, P (H1)) > (1− δ)Tσ)} < e−Tσδ
2
2 (8)
When T = 2σδ2 lnn, with probability less than
1
n , the file
requester will appear less than (1− δ)Tσ times.
Also we need to make sure that any non-requester will not
appear more than (1− δ)Tσ times, thus we set:
This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE INFOCOM 2009 proceedings.
1175
(1− δ)Tσ = (1 + δ′)Tσ′
δ′ =
σ(1− δ)
σ′
− 1 (9)
We apply Chernoff Bound again to make sure the non-
requester will not appear too frequently.
Pr {B(T, σ′) < (1 + δ′)Tσ′} < 2−δ′Tσ′
= 2−T (σ(1−δ)−σ
′) (10)
When T = aσ(1−δ)−σ′ lgn, where a is a constant, with
probability 1na , a given non-requesting node will show up to
the collaborator more than (1 + δ′)Tσ′ times. Now we have
(n− c) such non-requesting nodes in the network. By setting
a = logn(n − c) + 1 and applying Union Bound, there will
be less than 1n chance (since n−cna = 1n ) that any non-initiator
nodes will show up more than (1 + δ′)Tσ′ times.
We have T = 2σδ2 lnn and T =
a
σ(1−δ)−σ′ lgn. Therefore,
2lnn
σδ2
=
algn
σ(1− δ)− σ′
2lnnσ − (2lnnσ)δ − 2lnnσ′ = (algnσ)δ2
(algnσ)δ2 + (2lnnσ)δ + (2lnnσ′ − 2lnnσ) = 0 (11)
Solving the quadratic equation yields δ. Now with proba-
bility 1n , the initiator will appear fewer than T = (1 − δ)σ
times, and with probability 1n , there will be one or more non-
requester appearing more than T = (1 + δ′)σ′ = (1 − δ)σ.
Thus the probability that the file requester will be identified
wrongly is 1n2 .
Suppose n = 1000, c = 100, p = 0.5, we will obtain
δ = 0.5562. If we use a similar analysis method for Crowds,
we would need a total of 447 rounds in order to identify
the initiator. The chance that a non-initiator will appear more
frequently than the initiator will be about 1n2 . (In the analysis
of Crowds, σ = cn and σ
′ = cpn2−np(n−c) ). If we use the
analysis for our proposed scheme, a total of 3660 rounds are
needed to identify the file requester with the same failure
probability. It may not be very realistic if we want such a low
probability of failure (about 0.00001). We can further improve
the method by replacing the failure probability with 1k2 , where
k is any constant.
Similar to the steps given above, we obtain T = 2δ2 lnk,
T = aσ(1−δ)−σ′ lgk and the following quadratic equation
(algkσ)δ2 + (2lnkσ)δ + (2lnkσ′ − 2lnkσ) = 0 (12)
The probability of failure is 1102 with k = 10. Using the
same parameters n = 1000, c = 100, p = 0.5, in Crowds a
total of 148 rounds, while in our scheme a total of 1220 rounds
is needed. Figure 5 shows the number of rounds needed for
Crowds and MIX-Crowds.
In figure 5, we only show the results for p = 0.5. In contrast,
the number of rounds needed for different values of p in
Crowds and MIX-Crowds are almost the same (the difference
Fig. 5. The relationship between the probability of success and number of
rounds for Crowds and MIX-Crowds with p = 0.5
in number of rounds is less than several rounds). The main
reason is that it is quite unlikely that a non-requester node
shows up more than a requesting node(as it can be seen that
σ is much larger than σ′).
We can explore further the benefit of increasing p using
Reiter and Rubin’s definition of anonymity [20]. A number
of anonymity degrees are defined. Only three are useful
in analyzing most peer-to-peer anonymous systems, in file
retrieval systems context, namely
1) Beyond Suspicion - If an collaborator receives a mes-
sage(request) from another node, the node will be no
more likely to be the file requester (originator) of the
message than any other nodes in the system.
2) Probable Innocence - If an collaborator receives a
message(request) from another node, the node will be
no more likely to be the file requester (originator) than
not to be the file requester.
3) Possible Innocence - If an collaborator receives a
message(request)from another node, the node will be
more likely to be the file requester than not to be the
file requester.
In our case, suppose NR sends out a file request to another
node. Suppose if N1 and N2 are both collaborators, and if
p = 0.5, it can only be about 50% certain that NR is the
file requester. It may be possible that NR is just forwarding a
request for others. If 10% of the nodes are colllaborators, on
average the predecessor will be identified every 82 rounds, but
the number of rounds will increase dramatically if we want to
make sure that the file requester will appear enough (two or
more) times.
The number of rounds gives a rough estimation of how long
it is needed to identify the file requester of a particular file. On
the other hand, the degree of anonymity gives the collaborator
an idea of how likely the predecessor is the file requester.
In Crowds, the content returned from the web server is
only useful for the initiator. In our scheme, if p = 0.5, on
average two other nodes will have a copy of the requested
file after the transfer is done. As the file requester wants to
stay anonymous, it will not share the file. In this case the two
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nodes may further transfer the file to others by registering it in
the overlay network (after some random delay to prevent the
path from being revealed). However, some of the nodes may
not share the file. If p is small, it is likely that the file will
disappear in the network. At this stage, the file publisher NP
has to publish the file again using some anonymous publishing
method, increasing its risk of being identified.
B. Extending the Scheme
In the above procedure, the content of the file together with
the predecessor will only be revealed if all the chosen nodes
(e.g., N3 and N4 in figure 4) are controlled by the collaborator.
Even if the predecessor is revealed, the collaborator cannot be
sure that it is the original requester (the assumption is that
different files are being transfered in the system and delay
between nodes is long enough so that it is difficult for the
collaborator to carry out timing analysis).
Now if we increase the number of nodes chosen in each
forwarding decision from 2 to m. Then,
P (Cm,m) =
( c
n
)m
=
cm
nm
(13)
The chance that at least one of the m nodes is compromised
is:
P (C1..m−1,m) = 1−
( c
n
)m
−
(
n− c
n
)m
(14)
Similar to the previous analysis above, we will obtain,
σ = P (H1) = P (I ′) = P (I) + P (C1..m−1,m)P (I ′)
σ =
P (I)
1− P (C1..m−1,m) (15)
P (H2+) =
∞∑
i=1
(
p(n− c)m
nm
)i
σ
=
pσ(n− c)m
(nm − p(n− c)m) (16)
σ′ =
P (H2+)
n− c =
pσ(n− c)m−1
(nm − p(n− c)m) (17)
Substituting σ and σ′ back to equation 12 to solve for δ,
figure 6 shows the relationship between the number of rounds
needed and the probability of success for different values of
m.
Fig. 6. The relationship between the probability of success and number of
rounds for MIX-Crowds with p = 0.5 and different values of m
We can see that increasing m will make the success of
predecessor attack much more difficult (increase in power
order). However, the following should be noticed:
1) The intermediate nodes will not know the content of
the file. This is good for anonymity. However, this also
decreases the number of nodes registering the file on the
network.
2) It is more likely that at least one or more collaborators
will be chosen in each step. As a result, another group
of nodes has to be chosen. This will increase the transfer
time significantly if the number of nodes controlled by
the collaborator is large.
C. Comparison with Other Anonymous Communication Sys-
tem
Table V summarize a general comparison between MIX-
Crowds and some well-known anonymous communication
systems. The probability of innocence indicates the approx-
imate probability that when a node receives a message from
another node, how certain it can deduce that the node is the
initiator of the message (although the message content may
not be revealed). For MIX systems, the second or later MIXes
will know that the previous MIX is not the original sender
of the message, thus it is 0 in the table. Probability of all
nodes chosen by NR is compromised is same as P (H1) in
our analysis. Number of bits required to send out 1 bit data
indicates the efficiency of the network. For example in MIX
like systems (e.g. Onion Routing [10]), to retrieve the content
of a web page with size L bytes, at least mL bytes would be
required to be transferred on the network.
We can see that for schemes not using a directory server
to store public key information (Crowds, Hordes, Freenet), the
content transferred by the predecessor will always be revealed.
On the other hand, MIX networks encrypt the message with
layered encryption from the first node to the last node, thus
all intermediate nodes will not know about the content of the
transfer. The low efficiency of Freenet is due to the fact that
searching is done in a partially unstructured manner. MIX-
Crowds combines the idea of both Crowds and MIX. The
reason why other anonymous communication systems like
onion routing is used because no caching will be performed
in the intermediate nodes. For contents that needed to be
cached (e.g., files, frequently requested web documents), MIX-
Crowds provides a balance between anonymity and confiden-
tiality (among intermediate nodes) with the help of public key
systems and the directory server. For Crowds, a blender is
already needed to store the list of nodes, so the additional
cost for storing the public key of the nodes will not be high.
The performance of Crowds with p = 0.8 is similar to that
in MIX-Crowds with p = 0.6 and m = 2. It is harder for the
collaborator to identify the requester together with the content
of the request in MIX-Crowds as compare with Crowds of
similar level of efficiency.
In this section, we have analyzed the anonymity of MIX-
Crowds based on [26] with some modifications and extension.
We have also compared the anonymity of MIX-Crowds with
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System Name Probability of Innocence (0−
1]
Probability of all nodes chosen
by NR are compromised
Number of bits required to sent
out 1 bit data
Crowds [20] p(n−c−1)
n
c
n
O( 1
1−p )
Hordes [17] p(n−c−1)
n
c
n
O(No. of nodes in the multi-
cast group)
Freenet [8] depends on key closeness ≈ c
n
O(log n)
MIX [7] 0 ≈ ( c
n
)m O(m)
MIX-Crowds p(n−c−1)
n
≈ ( c
n
)m O( m
1−p )
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF MIX-CROWDS AND OTHER ANONYMITY COMMUNICATION SCHEMES
other anonymous communication systems and carried out
security analysis under some common types of attacks.
IV. CONCLUSION
A new anonymous communication network, MIX-Crowds,
based on the idea of MIX and Crowds is described in this pa-
per. The network can be used for different purposes, especially
when the content is needed to be cached and kept confidential
to other intermediate nodes.
In our proposed system, file searching and publishing can
be done with the help of an overlay network. By using the
idea of MIX, the file content is kept secret from the previous
nodes, while the retrieved file can be cached in the network
by using the idea of Crowds.
We modify the analysis method described in [26] to achieve
a lower number of rounds needed for the predecessor attack
with various levels of probability of success. Anonymity
analysis of MIX-Crowds for the modified scheme is given
in Section III. The result shows that it is harder for the
collaborators to find out the requester of a particular file F
based on the predecessor attack. Also by separating files into
four classes according to their size, transfer time for most
files can be shortened, while that for large files only increases
slightly.
There are still rooms of improvement for MIX-Crowds.
In particular, we need to address some of the issues like
bottleneck on the directory server, the better use of the overlay
network and how to increase the number of users in MIX-
Crowds to provide better anonymity. For analysis, as MIX-
Crowds is based on the concepts of MIX and Crowds, defense
against timing analysis should also be considered.
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